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Abstract:  
This paper offers an empirical assessment of the scope elasticity of multinational activity at the 
world level. By scope elasticity, we refer to the relationship between the productivity of the 
parent firm and the probability of operating in a given foreign market through subsidiaries 
with the same main activity. Elasticities are estimated for a baseline cross-section of 36 
countries that represent 74% of total outward FDI investment at the world level. At the 
aggregate level, results indicate quite consistently, through various estimation methods, that a 
10% increase in productivity of the parent firm increases the probability in a range between 
0.8-1.5%. Elasticities for manufacturing more than double the elasticities for the service sector.  
The paper also explores the heterogeneity of scope elasticities across home countries and 
sectors. This heterogeneity is related to differences across bilateral home-host country 
characteristics such as the size of the potential host market, bilateral distance, average tariff, 
institutional quality of host countries and other factors. The signs attached to these factors are 
in general consistent with the predictions of models of firm heterogeneity and FDI activity.  
Once heterogeneity and survey biases are controlled, scope elasticities reduce somewhat.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper offers an empirical assessment of multinational firms (MNCs) at the world level. The 
analysis concentrates on the estimation of scope elasticities of MNCs for a baseline cross-
section of 36 countries. Scope elasticities refer to the relationship between the productivity of 
the parent firm and the probability of operating in a given foreign market through subsidiaries 
with the same main activity as the parent firm. The paper also explores the relationship 
between these elasticities and host country characteristics where the subsidiaries are located.  
Models of firm heterogeneity and FDI activity motivate this analysis. This literature, originated 
in the seminal work of Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) (see Antràs and Yeaple, 2014 for a 
recent review article), is the reference to organize our empirical work. 
The data used is based on ORBIS, which is a Bureau van Dijck database. From this information, 
a sample of MNCs is obtained by selecting data of parent-affiliate pairs of firms. The baseline 
sample contains 19,216 parent MNCs that are ultimate owners (directly and indirectly) of 
112,545 affiliate firms operating in 170 host countries. The sample of parent firms comes from 
a group of home countries that represents 73.7% of total outward FDI investment at the world 
level, according to UNCTAD (2018).  
The sample of parent firms we take as a reference in this research is representative of a large 
fraction of world MNCs. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, in a previous paper (Fariñas, 
Martín-Marcos and Velázquez, 2018), we have shown that the ORBIS database has a good 
coverage of large firms for a broad set of countries. Secondly, large firms play a crucial role in 
the population of MNCs (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Both reasons lead us to point 
out that the sample of parent firms used in this empirical research is representative of the 
world population of MNCs. Therefore, the paper offers a general profile on several aspects of 
MNCs at the world level that have been recently highlighted by models of heterogeneity and 
FDI activity. 
The analysis considers parent firms that control one or more subsidiaries abroad to be MNCs. 
Both parent and subsidiary have to have the same main activity. The set of parent-subsidiary 
pairs of firms has to fulfill this condition to be included in the sample. We try to proxy 
horizontal FDI with this condition. This is consistent with the literature which combines two 
approaches and is used as our reference: the proximity-concentration model of Brainard 
(1993, 1997), with parent MNCs facing a trade-off between exporting or localizing similar 
production abroad through subsidiaries, and the heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003), with 
firms differing in their levels of productivity.  
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The previous empirical literature on heterogeneity and FDI activity has extensively 
documented the sorting of firms between purely domestic firms, exporters and MNCs. The  list 
of papers that document this feature includes Girma, Görg and Strobl (2004), Girma, Kneller 
and Pisu (2005), Tomiura (2007), Geishecker, Görg and Taglioni (2009), Arnold and Hussinger 
(2010), Castellani and Giovanetti (2010), Fariñas and Martín-Marcos (2010), Gullstrand, 
Olofsdotter and Thede (2016), Borin and Mancini (2016), Engel and Procher (2012) and a 
literature review by Greenaway and Kneller (2007), among others.  
Yeaple (2009) has addressed an additional aspect of this literature on heterogeneous MNCs. 
The selection mechanism that refers to domestic firms, exporters and MNCs, predicted by 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), also applies to the scope and scale of multinational firms. 
This question has been documented by Aw and Lee (2008), Geishecker, Görg and Taglione 
(2009), Chen and Moore (2010), Tanaka (2012, 2015), Nishiyama and Tamaguchi (2013), 
Damijan, Kostevc and Rojec (2016), Shao and Shang (2016) and Fariñas, Martín-Marcos and 
Velázquez (2018), among others. Most of these papers refer to individual countries (Taiwan, 
the USA, France, etc.) and to the manufacturing sector.  
The paper covers two features. First, we measure scope elasticities for a large set of individual 
countries. These elasticities refer to the relationship between the productivity of the parent 
firm and the probability of owning a subsidiary in a foreign market. We contribute to the 
recent empirical literature on MNCs and heterogeneity by providing, for the first time, 
estimates of elasticities for a large set of countries that represents almost 75% of total world 
outward FDI investment. An additional contribution is the distinction between manufacturing 
and services, which has hardly been considered in previous papers, at least not with the 
extension that it is done here. We provide estimates of scope elasticities for both sectors and 
countries. Furthermore, concerning the estimation of scope elasticities, we provide two 
alternatives. The first one is based on the estimation of the standard probability 0/1 that a 
parent firm operates in a given foreign market. The second one uses count models to estimate 
the probability associated with the number of affiliates a parent firm owns in a given foreign 
market.  This second alternative provides a different measure of scope elasticities as 
interesting as the previous one. The comparison of both measures provides the opportunity to 
conduct some robustness checks.     
The second feature the paper examines is the relationship, across countries and sectors, 
between home country elasticities and the characteristics of host countries where parent firms 
invest abroad. The objective is to examine the relationship between a set of bilateral home-
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host country characteristics and the values of home country scope elasticities. Previous 
literature has performed this analysis using either gravity equations of bilateral FDI flows 
between countries, as in the case of Yeaple (2009), or regression analysis that combines firm- 
level information and host country characteristics in the same equation, as in the cases of 
Chen and More (2010), Hyun and Hur (2013) and Tanaka (2015). Our approach is based on the 
use of scope elasticities estimated in a first stage and, then, they are related to a set of host 
country characteristics in a second stage. In the context of this literature, it is the first time this 
approach is applied to test basic predictions of models of multinationals and heterogeneity.  
Another characteristic of our analysis is that we follow the methodology known as Meta-
Regression Analysis (MRA) (see Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012), applied, in this context, 
internally to the set of elasticities estimated across countries.    
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical approach. Section 3 reports 
the characteristics of the dataset used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the main results. 
Section 5 reports some sensitivity analysis concerning the degree of aggregation of market 
destinations. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical approach  
This section explains the bases of the theoretical approach we use to organize our empirical 
work. As mentioned in the introduction, we take as a reference the literature of 
heterogeneous multinationals introduced by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). We consider 
two elements from this approach.  
The first element was developed by Yeaple (2009) and Chen and More (2010), among others. It 
postulates the existence of a relationship between the productivity of parent firms and the 
scope of their affiliates in foreign markets. In particular, more productive parent firms operate 
in a higher number of foreign countries, i.e., their scope of operations is higher.   
The second element that previous models introduced in the literature on multinational firms is 
that for each host country there is a productivity cutoff that drives the entry investment 
decision of parent firms in foreign markets. Host countries can be associated with a critical 
level of productivity, which is determined by country characteristics such as the level of fixed 
costs associated with starting a business, the level of countries’ marginal cost of production, 
and the size of the market potential, among others. Furthermore, bilateral features between 
the home and the host country like distance or sharing common features like language are also 
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relevant factors. All these country characteristics determine a critical level of productivity that 
parent firms have to reach to enter the host country. Differences across host countries in this 
set of characteristics have an impact on the structure of multinational activity from the 
perspective of parent MNCs located in different home countries. 
One important prediction that derives from the link between country characteristics and the 
existence of productivity cutoffs is that those country characteristics that positively 
(negatively) affect the scope of multinational activity should be negatively (positively) related 
to the average level of productivity of parent firms that go abroad. This prediction derives from 
the model of Yeaple (2009). Let us take as a reference the market potential (size) of host 
countries, which many papers (see, for example, Blonigen and Piger, 2014) document as 
positively affecting the scope of multinational activity, i.e., it raises the probability of observing 
a parent firm investing in a given foreign market. Then, this characteristic will negatively 
influence the average productivity of firms that enter markets with a high market potential. 
The higher is the market potential of the host country is, the lower the critical level of 
productivity required to enter that market. The consequence of this is that the average 
productivity of firms that enter countries with a higher market potential is lower than the 
average productivity of firms that enter countries of less market potential.  
In a previous paper, Fariñas, Martín-Marcos and Velázquez (2018) confirm these predictions 
for a large sample of European manufacturing firms. Host country characteristics that 
positively affect the level of multinational activity are negatively associated with the average 
level of parent firms’ productivity. Conversely, those host country characteristics that are 
negatively associated with MNC activity tend to be positively associated with parent firms’ 
productivity. In fact, observed differences in the distribution of parent firms’ productivity are 
consistent with these expected signs. This happens when we compare groups of multinational 
firms that differ in the size of the host market where they invest, the distance to the host 
country, the existence of contiguity between the home and the host markets and the condition 
of sharing common features like the language, a currency or past colonial links.  
This prediction, the “asymmetric effect hypothesis,” indicates that host country characteristics 
that encourage a greater scope of multinational activity induce the entry of successively less 
productive firms, so the average productivity is lower relative to firms that enter more difficult 
markets. The opposite is true for countries with characteristics that discourage MNCs.  
Summing up what has been said so far, there are two main types of predictions in the 
literature on heterogeneity and multinationals. The first one refers to the existence of a 
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positive link between firm productivity and the scope of the firm’s multinational activity. The 
positive elasticities of scope with respect to a parent firm’s productivity summarizes this 
relationship. The second element, the “asymmetric effect hypothesis,” refers to the 
relationship between host country characteristics and the average level of productivity of 
parent firms operating abroad.  
The empirical literature interested in simultaneously testing both types of hypotheses is rather 
scarce and can be grouped into two categories. First, Yeaple (2009) offers evidence for US 
manufacturing MNCs, estimating the relationship between the probability of operating in a 
foreign market and the productivity of parent companies. On the other hand, the analysis is 
completed with the estimation of gravity equations that relate the number of MNCs that 
invest in host countries and the characteristics of these destinations. Fariñas, Martín-Marcos 
and Velázquez (2018), in a less structural context, follow a similar approach for a large sample 
of European manufacturing firms. The second approach estimates the relationship between 
the probability of MNCs investing in foreign markets and both the productivity of parent firms 
and host country characteristics. Chen and Moore (2010) offer evidence for French 
manufacturing firms, Hyun and Hur (2013) for Korean firms and Tanaka (2015) for Japanese 
firms in the distribution service industry. 
This paper follows a slightly different approach to examine the empirical consequences of the 
two hypotheses previously described. We distinguish between two stages. In the first one, we 
estimate the elasticities of scope for a large set of countries. They summarize the strength of 
the relationship between firm productivity and the scope activity of parent multinationals from 
the home country. We explore the magnitude of the average elasticity and the heterogeneity 
of elasticities across countries. In the second stage, we explore the relationship between the 
estimated elasticities and the average host country’s characteristics.  
For the second stage, the two predictions summarized above allow us to establish the 
direction, positive or negative, for the relationship between the elasticities of home countries 
and the average characteristics of host countries where parent multinationals locate their 
subsidiary firms. A host-country characteristic that positively (negatively) affects the 
probability of investing abroad has the same positive (negative) relationship with scope 
elasticities. In the case of a variable with a positive influence on the probability of investing 
abroad, the asymmetric hypothesis implies that the same variable has a negative influence on 
the average productivity of parent firms that invest abroad. Hence, a positive influence of the 
variable on the probability (numerator) combined with a negative influence on the average 
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productivity (denominator) implies a positive relationship between the variable and the 
elasticity. A variable with a negative effect on the probability (numerator) combines with a 
positive effect on the productivity (denominator) and, therefore, the overall effect is negative. 
This rule means that the asymmetric effect hypothesis always reinforces the direction of the 
variable on the probability of investing abroad. If positive, it is positive in terms of the 
elasticity, and if negative, the effect is also negative for the elasticity.         
The paper takes as a reference the framework provided by the two predictions summarized in 
this section to organize the empirical work.   
 
3. Data  
The data used are taken from the Bureau van Dijck ORBIS database. This dataset provides 
information about the balance sheets and income statements of more than 250 million firms 
around the world. These financial statements are complemented with information on the 
ownership structure of companies from both the perspective of shareholders in the capital 
structure of the company and shares of the company in the capital of other companies 
(subsidiaries). This information on the ownership structure of the company refers to the end of 
the year 2015.  
The sample of MNCs selected from ORBIS includes parent firms from a given country i that 
control one or more subsidiaries in the rest of the world. The sample considers only parents 
and subsidiaries that have the same main activity defined as Bureau van Dijck major sectors1. 
This condition approximates horizontal FDI that is consistent with the theoretical literature 
that we take as a reference to organize this empirical work.    
Even though ORBIS is a collection of business records that does not include the whole 
population of firms, it has a good coverage of the set of the largest firms in OECD countries. 
Fariñas, Martín-Marcos and Velázquez (2018) assess the representativeness of the ORBIS 
dataset for a large set of European countries. They take as a reference the proportion between 
the number of manufacturing firms available in ORBIS and the number of large firms reported 
in the OECD Structural and Demographic Business Statistics. The analysis concludes that the 
representativeness of ORBIS is quite high, so we consider our analysis in this paper to be 
                                                          
1
 We start from the 19 Bureau van Dijck major sectors but we group the six manufacturing sectors into 
one to maximize the volume of information available. 
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representative of the population of MNCs at the world level. For more details on the 
representativeness of ORBIS, see Pinto-Ribeiro, Menghinello and Baker (2010).   
To identify the parent-subsidiary firms link, we use the criterion of “ultimate control” (OECD, 
2005). The goal of introducing this criterion is to ensure that the subsidiary is effectively under 
the control of a parent firm from country i. Under this criterion, we consider both direct and 
indirect participation in the capital of the subsidiary. The condition that we use for completing 
the path linking parent and subsidiary firms requires that, at every step of participation in the 
capital, the parent firm owns more than 50% of the capital of the subsidiary. The notion of 
ultimate control ensures that the nationality that we attribute to each company is correctly 
imputed. We consider this criterion more precise than the alternative notion of “immediate 
property.” 
An additional condition that we impose on the information that is extracted from ORBIS is that 
the parent firms have unconsolidated information. This requirement implies that the financial 
statement of the subsidiary is not combined with the information of parent firms. Although 
this reduces the number of firms in the sample, we minimize the existence of financial flows 
from parent and subsidiaries, which is suitable for mitigating the problems of reverse causality 
in the estimation of scope elasticities.        
Table 1 summarizes the number of firms in the sample. The initial sample identifies 41,109 
parent firms that are ultimate owners of 196,538 subsidiaries with the same main activity. 
Parent firms are of 145 different nationalities and subsidiaries are located in 195 different 
countries. The sample in column (2) imposes the condition that parent firms have 
unconsolidated information available. This condition reduces the number of firms in the 
sample to 28,427 parent companies and 170,582 subsidiaries. From these numbers, the final 
sample is reduced to what appears in column (3). This is our baseline sample. It includes a 
sample of parent firms from a set of 36 home countries where the coverage permits the 
estimation of scope elasticities. One of the objectives of this paper is to estimate elasticities at 
the country level, distinguishing between manufacturing and services. Given that the ORBIS 
coverage across countries is very heterogeneous, the final sample of home countries is 
reduced to 36.  
The baseline sample takes as a reference multinational firms from the following 36 countries: 
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czechia, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, 
Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, the 
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Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Taiwan, and the United States of America2. 
In the sample of home countries, we have a large number of European countries (28) plus a list 
of 8 countries: Australia, Canada, Chile, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan 
and the United States of America. The list of host countries where subsidiaries are located 
includes almost all the countries in the world. As we mention in the introduction, this sample 
of parent firms is from a group of home countries that represents 73.7% of total outward FDI 
investment at the world level, according to UNCTAD (2018).   
The very large number of host countries in the sample prevents the application of some 
estimation procedures used in the paper. For this reason, we take as our baseline definition of 
host markets the Classification of Geographic Regions defined by the United Nations. This 
classification distinguishes 22 geographic regions at the world level. According to the last 
Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use (United Nations, 1999), “these geographic 
regions are based on continental regions, which are further subdivided into sub-regions and 
intermediary regions drawn to obtain greater homogeneity in sizes of population, 
demographic circumstances and accuracy of demographic statistics.” Section 5 presents some 
sensitivity analysis that refers to the use of individual countries instead of geographic regions 
as destination markets. We compare estimated scope elasticities estimated using both 
definitions of destination markets: geographic regions and countries.     
Concerning the variables used in the analysis, there are two types of information. The first one 
refers to firms. The source for this information is ORBIS. These variables are gross output 
(measured by operating revenue turnover), employment (total number of employees) and 
labor productivity (gross output/employment). Limitations in the available information prevent 
us from using total factor productivity as the measure of parent firm productivity. The use of 
this alternative measure would substantially reduce the baseline sample of home countries 
with information available for estimating scope elasticities. This would substantially limit the 
number of observations for the second stage of our analysis.   
Concerning the variables used to measure host country characteristics, the basic variables 
come from four sources. Home and host basic economic indicators come from the World Bank. 
Country institutional measures come from two sources: the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
of the World Bank (see Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010) and the Global Competitiveness 
                                                          
2
 For Canada, Chile, Croatia, Malaysia and the United States of America, most of the information is non-
consolidated with a few exceptions for some firms.  
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Index from the World Economic Forum (see World Economic Forum, 2011). Finally, gravity 
type variables come from the GeoDist database from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). The set 
of these variables includes GDP and per capita GDP of home and host countries, bilateral 
distance between home and host country, existence of a common language, degree of cultural 
closeness, average tariff of the host country and seven institutional quality indicators of the 
host countries. Section 4 gives details about how these variables are calculated.  Table 2 shows 
some descriptive statistics of explanatory variables.  
 
4. Results 
The first part of this section presents the estimates of scope elasticities obtained by 
considering two alternative dependent variables. In Subsection 4.1, we define a standard 0/1 
variable corresponding to the decision of a parent firm to invest in a given foreign market. In 
Subsection 4.2, count data models are used to estimate an equation containing the number of 
subsidiaries a parent firm has in a given foreign market as a dependent variable. In the last 
subsection, we use meta-regression analysis toolboxes to examine the heterogeneity of 
estimated scope elasticities across countries. In this second stage, we control for a set of 
bilateral home/host country characteristics that the literature of FDI has considered as factors 
affecting the decision to invest abroad.   
 
4.1 Scope elasticities: the probability of investing in a foreign market. 
First, we provide estimates of scope elasticities across countries. These elasticities measure 
how the probability of investing in a given foreign market changes with the level of 
productivity of the parent firms. The specification is as follows:    
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑔𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑔𝑔 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝑓𝑖𝑗     (1) 
where 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a variable equal to one if parent firm f from home country i has one or more 
subsidiaries in host geographical region j at time period t and 𝐿𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 is parent labor 
productivity at time t-1.  A complete set of industry (two-digit level), 𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑔, home 
country, 𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖, and host geographical region, 𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗, fixed effects are included in 
equation (1).  
The reason for making investment decisions by firms at time period t and measuring labor 
productivity of parent firms lagged at t-1 is to mitigate the consequences of reverse causality 
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between past investment decisions abroad and current productivity. To further minimize the 
effect of investment decisions abroad and the income statement of parent firm, the estimates 
of labor parent productivity are based on unconsolidated information. We impose this 
restriction on the information used to minimize the impact of economic flows between parent 
and subsidiary firms in measuring parent firm productivity.  
The upper part of Table 3 reports coefficients estimated from equation (1) for the whole 
sample of multinational firms. The first column corresponds to the total economy (the sample 
includes manufacturing and services plus the primary sector, construction and energy). The 
second and third columns correspond to the sample of manufacturing and service firms, 
respectively. The coefficient 0.0066 for the total economy means that a 1% increase in 
productivity increases the probability of opening a subsidiary in a given foreign market by 
0.000066. Given that in the whole sample of firms the average probability of observing a 
parent multinational in a foreign market is 8.1%, an increase of 10% in parent firms’ 
productivity raises the probability by 0.8. % (0.00066/0.081).   
Table 3 also reports the estimated elasticities for both manufacturing and services. Notice that 
for manufacturing firms, it is 1.4, which more than doubles the elasticity for services, 0.6. To 
our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to systematically measure scope elasticities by 
distinguishing between manufacturing and services. The elasticity is systematically larger for 
manufacturing than for services. The null hypothesis that both coefficients for manufacturing 
and services are equal can be rejected at any significant level. One possible reason that 
explains this difference is associated with the fact that the trade-off between proximity and 
concentration (Brainard, 1997) is more relevant for manufacturing than for services.  
Trade in services accounts for 23% of total trade in goods and services at the world level, 
according to the WTO (2018). From 2005, the rate of participation of services in total trade has 
rapidly increased in part because of the expansion of digitally enabled services. According to 
UNCTAD (2015), finance, insurance, telecommunication and information services, and the 
large set of professional and business services are in the group of most intensive digital 
deliverable services. Even though new ICT technologies relax constraints on cross-border trade 
in services, obstacles remain, e.g., cultural and language differences, etc., (see WTO, 2018), 
and FDI investment in services abroad is an alternative to trade. Therefore, the trade-off 
proximity-concentration, which is a key ingredient of models of heterogeneity and 
multinational activity, is relevant for services as well as for manufacturing. However, the 
nature of this trade-off is surely different for both types of activities, as it is stricter for 
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manufacturing firms than for services. In turn, this translates into systematic differences in 
scope elasticities across both manufacturing and services activities, with elasticities much 
higher for manufacturing than for services.  
Our objective is to estimate scope elasticities not only at the aggregate level but also for 
individual countries. Table 4 reports estimated scope elasticities across individual countries for 
the total economy.  Tables A1 and A2, in the Appendix, reproduce the estimates at the country 
level for the subset of manufacturing and service sectors. The bottom part of Table 3 
summarizes these individual countries´ estimates. Our baseline sample takes 36 countries as a 
reference. We also reach this number of estimates/countries for the sample of firms from the 
service sector, but it is inferior for manufacturing, where we are able to estimate the elasticity 
for 34 countries. This happens because there is a lack of information for Cyprus and Iceland.  
We find significant differences in the elasticities across countries. For the total economy, the 
country with the highest elasticity, Japan, indicates that an increase of 10% in the productivity 
of Japanese parent firms raises the probability to have of having a subsidiary in a given foreign 
market by 3.4%. For the lowest positive and statistically significant elasticity, Austria and 
Canada, an increase of 10% in productivity raises the probability by 0.3%. A big proportion of 
estimated elasticities are statistically significant and positive, 52.8% of the countries in the 
sample for the total economy. We do not estimate negative elasticities that are statistically 
significant different from zero. These results confirm that the positive relationship between 
productivity and the scope of multinational activity, i.e., the probability of opening subsidiaries 
in foreign markets that have the same main activity as the parents, is a relevant characteristic 
of multinational activity.  
Concerning the ranking of countries according to their scope elasticities, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, France, Ireland and Chile are the countries with the highest elasticities. Hong Kong, 
Poland, the Netherlands, Estonia and Romania are at the bottom of the ranking with 
elasticities not significantly different from zero. 
The existence of differences in elasticities between manufacturing and services, mentioned 
before at the aggregate level, is also confirmed when the comparison is across countries. In 
general terms, elasticity in manufacturing is higher relative to services across countries. 
However, the ranking of countries differs somewhat when comparing manufacturing and 
services. This is especially true at the top of the classification: Germany has the highest level in 
manufacturing while Japan occupies the first position in services. France is the only country 
that remains in the top five group in both classifications. At the bottom of the classification, for 
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low elasticities, the ranking of countries varies greatly. According to the coefficient of 
variation, the variability of scope elasticities across countries is higher in the service sector 
than in the manufacturing sector.   
To complete this description about the magnitude of scope elasticities, we compute their 
values at the aggregate level, taking the 36 elasticities estimated at the country level as a 
reference. We weight the value for each country by its relative participation in the total 
number of parent firms. The weighted average elasticities are also reported in Table 3. The 
value for the total economy is 1.2, slightly higher than the 0.8 we obtain when pooling all the 
observations in the same regression. This implies the existence of a positive correlation at the 
country level between the number of multinationals and the value of the estimated 
coefficient. For manufacturing and services there is a similar pattern, and for manufacturing 
the elasticity remains higher with respect to services.             
Subsection 4.3 will go into detail in the analysis of this degree of heterogeneity across 
countries, taking advantage of the fact that every estimated elasticity has a standard error 
attached to it.     
 
4.2 Scope elasticities based on count data models  
This section presents an alternative measure of scope elasticities based on the complete 
information available in the dataset. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the number of 
subsidiary firms owned by parent firms in a given market. The total number of observations, 
considering geographical regions as destinations, is 345,928. Of these observations, 92% are 
zeros, i.e.,  there is no subsidiary from a given parent firm, 5% are ones, i.e., the parent firm 
has one subsidiary, and the rest of the observations, 3.1%, correspond to parent firms with 
two or more subsidiaries in the same market. This last possibility is more frequent in 
manufacturing than in services.  
The response variable is discrete, as in the linear probability model estimated in the previous 
subsection, but we also observe a few small, discrete, non-negative integer values that 
correspond to the number of subsidiaries that parent MNCs have in each market. Given this 
property of the response variable, it seems appropriate to use count data models for the 
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estimation of scope elasticities. In this subsection, we estimate scope elasticities taking into 
consideration this approach.   
The basic specification is the classical Poisson model: 
𝑁𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 = exp [𝜆𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜇𝑔𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑔𝑔 + ∑ 𝜇𝑖𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜇𝑗𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑗 ] + 𝜀𝑓𝑖𝑗  
(2)  
where 𝑁𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the number of subsidiary firms owned by parent firm f from home country i in 
host geographical region j at period t, and 𝐿𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 and the set of right-hand control variables 
are as in previous equation (1).  
Two issues related to the estimation of equation (2) are addressed (see Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005). The first one refers to the assumption of equal mean and variance the Poisson model 
makes, a feature called over-dispersion. We modify the Poisson model, also estimating the 
negative binomial. The second issue is the “excess zeros problem,” which refers to situations 
where there are more zeros in the data than the Poisson or the Negative Binominal predicts. In 
this case, a modified model is called the zero-inflated model in the Poisson version (ZIP) and 
the zero-inflated in the negative binomial version (ZINB). These latter models complement a 
count density with a binary process. If the binary process takes the value 0, then our count 
variable is N = 0, and if the binary process takes the value 1, then variable N is equal to 1, 2, 
3…. Both models, ZIP and ZIBN, are estimated in two stages. In the first one, a binary logit 
model is estimated with the decision to open a subsidiary abroad or not. In the second stage, 
the discrete variable is examined, taking into account only the zeros that are the consequence 
of a do/not-to-do decision. This stage is modeled by a Poisson in the ZIP model and by a 
negative binomial in the ZINB model. Coefficients are interpreted directly as elasticities when 
the variable is continuous in logarithms, as is the case for labor productivity. 
Table 5 reports the main results at the aggregate level. Only negative binomial models are 
reported because over-dispersion tests always reject Poisson versions. With respect to zero- 
inflated versions, Wilson (2015) has recently criticized the misuse of Vuong's test to test zero-
inflated models against non-zero inflated versions. Table 5 reports both, and given the high 
number of zeros in the sample, we prefer zero-inflated negative binomial maximum likelihood 
estimates (ZINBML). 
Scope elasticities, at the aggregate level, indicate that a 10% increase in labor productivity 
raises the probability of controlling a subsidiary in a foreign market and/or of operating an 
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additional subsidiary by 1.5% (second column of Table 5). The estimated elasticity in Table 3, 
which takes the discrete 1/0 decision as a dependent variable, is between 0.8-1.2%. We 
confirm a similar pattern between manufacturing and services, higher elasticities in the first 
ones than in the second ones.  
We interpret that the disparity between both elasticities reflects differences in the way the 
scope elasticity is measured. The elasticity based on count models measures the increase in 
the number of subsidiaries in those cases where the parent firm is already present in a given 
foreign market. This latter aspect is not captured when the elasticity corresponds to the 
decision variable to have/not-to-have a subsidiary in a foreign market. 
Table A3 in the Appendix reproduces the elasticities estimated for the entire sample of 
countries. For the total economy, the estimates for Czechia and Hungary do not converge and 
the sample is reduced from 36 to 34 countries. The ranking of scope elasticities across 
countries is very similar for both count models and standard ones. The Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient gives a value of 0.748, and the null hypothesis that both rankings are 
statistically independent can be rejected at any significant level. The rank correlation across 
countries is lower for manufacturing firms but still statistically significant.  
In the next section, we examine the heterogeneity of these elasticity measures across 
countries taking into account the correlation between them and bilateral home-host country 
characteristics. This analysis would be performed for both elasticities, the more standard 
measure defined in terms of a 0/1 probability of investing abroad and the elasticity based on 
count models.    
 
 
4.3 Scope elasticities and heterogeneity: a meta-regression analysis.  
This section deals with the issue of heterogeneity of scope elasticities across countries and 
sectors. The objective is to examine the relationship between a set of bilateral home-host 
country characteristics and the values of home countries’ scope elasticities. To perform this 
analysis, we follow the methodology known as Meta-Regression Analysis (MRA) (see Stanley 
and Doucouliagos, 2012, for a general presentation), which involves analyzing the distribution 
of estimated coefficients and identifying elements that drive heterogeneity in scope 
elasticities.  Specifically, we perform an internal meta-analysis given that we exclusively use 
the results obtained from our research, which applies the same methodology, but where the 
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sample is modified, in our case by sectors and countries.  Note that sectors are the aggregates: 
total economy, manufacturing and services. 
Figure 1 presents the funnel plot of the distribution of coefficients attached to scope 
elasticities for a given country and sector. The scatter of points illustrates the relationship 
between the coefficients and their precision. Precision is measured as the inverse of the 
standard error associated with each coefficient. The solid line corresponds to the average of all 
coefficients weighted by the inverse of their variance. According to this weight, the more 
precise the estimated coefficient is, the higher the weight attached to that value in the 
average.   
The existence of asymmetry in the magnitude of scope elasticities across countries and sectors 
cannot be ruled out from a visual examination of the funnel plot. The extreme values in the 
lower right corner correspond to Germany, Finland, France, Norway, Malaysia for 
manufacturing, and Japan for both manufacturing and services.   
Our standard MRA model is given by the following specification, which corresponds to a cross-
section of observations for a set of home countries i with parent multinationals operating in 
sector s:   
?̂?𝑖𝑠 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾0𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑠 + ∑ 𝛾𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠          (3) 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑠 denotes the estimated coefficients for country i in sector s. The standard error of 
these coefficients is represented by 𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑠,  𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑠 represents k regressors capturing factors that 
explain heterogeneity in elasticities across countries, and  𝑑𝑠𝑠 is a set of sector dummies that 
correspond to the aggregate of total economy, manufacturing and services.  
The MRA approach applies Weighted Least Squares (WLS) to the estimation of equation (3), 
using the inverse of the variance of estimated coefficients as weights (
1
𝑠𝑒2
) . In standard MRA, 
the 𝛾0𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑠 term captures the impact of the so-called publication selection bias. A test of 
𝛾0 = 0   (also known as the Funnel Asymmetry Test because of its relation to funnel graphs) is 
a test of the existence of both asymmetry in the estimates and publication bias (see Stanley, 
2005). In our case, as the meta-analysis is internal, i.e., it applies to the same dataset using the 
same estimation procedure, the bias arises because of differences in the way in which home 
country parent firms were surveyed. ORBIS combines information from different statistical 
sources that differ by country, so we identify this source of heterogeneity with a survey bias. 
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The magnitude of effects beyond the survey bias are captured in equation (3) by (𝛼0 +
∑ 𝛾𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑘 ). In this framework, 𝛼0 is the average estimated value of all estimated 
𝛼´s corrected for survey bias and for modelled heterogeneity. A test of 𝛼0 = 0 has been called 
the Precision-Effect Test and is a test of the existence of an underlying effect after correcting 
for the indicated elements.  The estimation of equation (3) is based on the use of WLS 
estimates with robust standard errors and clustered corrected standard errors (see Stanley 
and Doucouliagos 2017,   and Oczkowski and Doucouliagos, 2015).      
Concerning the set of regressors (𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑠) to be included in equation (3), section 3 states that 
models of multinational activity and heterogeneity predict that the country average scope 
elasticity at the country level is influenced by the composition of host country characteristics 
where parent firms invest abroad. Factors that affect both the level of multinational activity, 
i.e., the probability of operating in a given foreign market, and the average productivity of 
parent firms that invest in a given host country, are candidates to be included as regressors.  
The literature on MNCs has suggested a list of factors that determine multinationals’ location 
choices (see Greenaway and Kneller, 2007; Faeth, 2009; Blonigen and Piger, 2014; Head and 
Meyer, 2014; Görg, 2016 and Kano and Verveke, 2019 for general presentations). The first 
element to be included in this list is the size of the host country (Blonigen, 2005, Chen and 
Moore, 2010). Concerning the measurement of host country market size, Head and Mayer 
(2004) suggest that the market potential of host countries should include both their domestic 
market and other potential export markets. Second, traditional gravity equation variables, like 
distance and home and host GDP, have been extensively used in the empirical literature on 
determinants of FDI (Kleynert and Toubal, 2010; Head and Meyer, 2014). Third, host country 
business production costs have also been considered (Blonigen and Piger, 2014), also including 
differences of corporate tax rates between the home and the host countries in this category 
(Barrios, Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème, 2009). The fourth is fixed cost of investment 
associated with the cost of starting a business in the host country, and host countries’ 
regulatory and governance quality associated with various forms of fixed cost of investment 
(Berden, Bergstrand and van Etten, 2014). Fifth, bilateral cultural links, i.e., sharing a common 
language, and past colonial links have also been widely considered determinants of FDI 
(Blonigen and Piger, 2014). Finally, several aspects of trade costs, e.g., bilateral distance, 
contiguity and the average tariff rate, have also been included as controls (Chen and More, 
2010), along with the existence of various forms of bilateral trade agreements (Blonigen and 
Piger, 2014).   
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Taking this list of factors as a reference, we include the following set of variables as regressors 
in equation (3). First, the variable market size (host) is a dummy variables equal to 1 if the 
average size of all host countries with affiliates from parent firms of home country i operating 
in sector s is higher than average and 0 if it is lower than average. Second, the variable distance 
is the natural logarithm of average distance between home country i and all host countries 
with affiliates from country i in sector s. 
Third, to proxy bilateral cultural links that might favor FDI activity, two variables are 
considered. The variable common language is the proportion of host countries with affiliates in 
sector s that share with home country i either an official language or languages spoken by at 
least 20% of the population, on one hand, or languages (mother tongue, lingua franca or 
second languages) spoken by between 9% and 20% of the population, on the other hand.  The 
variable common language is an aggregate of both variables obtained by applying weights 
extracted from the use of factor analysis techniques. The second variable is cultural closeness. 
It is based on a common factor obtained from three weighted variables indicating: 1) whether 
the home and host countries have had a common colonizer after 1945; 2) whether both 
countries have ever had a colonial link; and 3) whether they have had a colonial relationship 
after 1945. The information used to estimate both variables is based on the GeoDist database 
(see Mayer and Zignago, 2011).  
Fourth, to proxy institutional factors associated with various forms of fixed costs of 
investment, we consider four variables obtained from Global Governance Indicators of the 
World Bank (see Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). These variables measure average 
quality of host countries with affiliates from a given home country in sector s. The four 
variables refer to the regulatory quality of host countries, government effectiveness, the 
quality of rule of law (contract enforcement, property rights, etc.) and control of corruption. 
Three additional variables that also measure the quality of institutions come from the Global 
Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum (see World Economic Forum, 2011). The 
three variables are the quality of both public and private institutions, and the business impact 
of rules on FDI. This latter indicator refers to the extent to which rules and regulations 
encourage or discourage FDI. Interestingly, applying a factor analysis to these seven variables 
produces two factors. The first one groups together the four World Bank variables and we call 
this factor institutional quality_WB.  The second factor correlates strongly with the three WEF 
variables and we call this factor the institutional quality_WEF.       
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Fifth, the variable tariffs is the natural logarithm of the average tariff rate of host countries 
with affiliates from home country i.   
Finally, we include two control variables to capture the size of the home country and its per-
capita income, GDP (home) and per capita GDP (home), both in natural logarithms. 
With the purpose of illustrating the way in which host-country characteristics for each home 
country i have been calculated, we give some additional details. These measures correspond to 
weighted averages of host country variables. For example, the variables market size (host) and 
tariffs weight, at the firm level, the existence of subsidiaries in the host country, i.e., 0/1 
weight. An identical procedure applies to bilateral characteristics between home and host 
countries (i.e., distance, common language, etc.) Figure3 illustrates, for each home country i, 
the average distance from this country to host countries where parent firms have subsidiaries. 
There is a high variability in average bilateral distances across countries. The average distance 
across all countries is 3,087 Km. The range goes from 10,986 Km (Australia) to 431 Km. 
(Croatia). Given the set of countries included in the sample, Australia, the USA, and western 
Asian countries (Japan, the Republic of Korea) are the countries with the greatest distance, and 
central European countries (Hungary, Croatia, the Czech Republic, etc.) are the countries with 
the shortest average distance. Table A4 in the Appendix offers the average value of host 
country characteristics for a selection of variables and for each home country.  
Concerning this set of country characteristics, we expect that those that positively affect the 
level of multinational activity, market size (host), common language, cultural closeness, 
institutional quality (World Bank and WEF versions) and tariffs, should be positively associated 
with the scope elasticities of home countries. In the case of tariffs, the positive association is 
based on the expectation that the higher the tariff rate of the host country is, the more 
incentive the parent firm from a home country has to produce within the boundaries of the 
host market (Chen and Moore, 2010). The variable distance to the host country is considered 
to be negatively associated with the level of multinational activity. In this case, we expect that 
affiliates located in markets that are more distant are likely to incur higher fixed entry and 
monitoring costs, thereby discouraging multinational activity. At the same time, a greater 
distance gives more room to FDI on the basis that proximity to consumers saves transport 
costs. The effect for this variable goes in both directions and the expected sign in equation (3) 
is ambiguous, although, in most cases, the literature reports negative signs, so we expect a 
negative sign.  
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Table 6 reports the estimation results of equation (3). The dependent variable corresponds to 
estimated coefficients of equation (1) (summarized in Table 3). Baseline OLS results and WLS 
using robust and cluster-robust standard errors by the set of home countries are reported.  
The funnel plot (Figure 1) displays heterogeneity that can be due to survey bias (heterogeneity 
in the survey process) and heterogeneity across bilateral home-host country characteristics 
that influence elasticity size. The coefficient associated with the standard error provides a 
basis for testing the existence of survey bias (𝛾0 = 0). As the coefficient is statistically 
significant for all WLS-estimated models, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Hence, we 
conclude that asymmetry in the funnel plot can be attributed to both survey bias and 
heterogeneity in elasticities across countries. 
The constant term (𝛼0) for WLS-estimated models is 0.0044. This coefficient implies, for an 
average probability of 0.08, an elasticity of 0.6% (0.00044/0.08=0.0055). Therefore, an 
increase of 10% in parent firm productivity raises the probability of operating in a given foreign 
market by 0.6%. Hence, once heterogeneity and publication bias are controlled, the elasticity 
reduces somewhat. Results for the set of sector dummies indicate that there are significant 
differences between elasticities for manufacturing and for services, as we mention in previous 
sections. 
Five of the variables included in equation (3) to control for heterogeneity across bilateral 
home-host country characteristics are significant explanatory variables: market size of the host 
country, distance, common language, institutional quality of host countries (measured with 
variables obtained from the Global Governance Indicators of the World Bank) and tariffs. The 
WLS estimates for each of these variables are statistically significant and all of them, except 
common language, have the expected sign.  
The market size of the host country that we expect to be positively associated with the entry 
of affiliates and therefore with scope elasticities is significant at the 10% confidence interval 
for WLS that uses robust standard errors. We expect the coefficient of average tariffs of the 
host country to be positive as tariff barriers create incentives to locate production in the host 
country. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 1-5% level for all WLS estimates.   
Sharing a common language and cultural closeness (existence of past colonial links) might 
reduce the fixed cost of entry in foreign markets and stimulate FDI. Therefore, we expect both 
characteristics to be positively associated with the elasticity of scope. Coefficients reported in 
Table 6 indicate a negative and significant effect for common language and no significant 
impact from cultural closeness.   
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Finally, variables that capture the level of institutional quality of the host countries are 
positively related to scope elasticities when the quality of institutions is measured using Global 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank but not the WEF variables from the World 
Competitiveness Index.  
Overall, we observe that a group of bilateral home-host country characteristics is related in a 
systematic way to the size of scope elasticities across home countries.  
Two additional variables that capture characteristics of the home country, its GDP and per 
capita GDP, are included to control for heterogeneity. The level of GDP is positively associated 
with scope elasticities: larger countries have greater elasticities. The relationship is not 
statistically significant for per capita income of the home country.  
Table 7 reports the estimates that correspond to equation (3) when the dependent variable is 
the coefficients estimated using count models. Results are very similar to those presented in 
Table 6. Despite this general coincidence, three qualifications should be mentioned. First, the 
standard error variable is not statistically significant for all WLS-estimated models. This implies 
that there is no survey bias once variables that capture general home-host country 
heterogeneity are included in equation (3). This probably means that asymmetry is lower for 
count elasticities than for standard elasticities. Second, modifications in the significance of 
variables are concentrated in two variables, market size (host) and GDP (home). Neither is 
statistically significant different from zero. The rest of the variables present the same pattern 
as in table 6. Third, institutional quality (host) is included as a single variable because the factor 
analysis summarizes the seven variables considered in a single factor (not two). This is because 
the sample of countries is slightly different in the two tables. The variable institutional quality 
(host) has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant across all WLS-estimated 
models.  
Concerning the magnitude of the average elasticity, the constant term for WLS-estimated 
models is 0.1296. This implies that the count elasticity is 1.3% when parent firm productivity 
increases by 10%, which, if compared with the average elasticity estimated in Subsection 4.2, 
1.5%, is quite close in size. It is slightly lower once heterogeneity is controlled.       
 
 
5. The level of aggregation of geographical destinations: sensitivity of results 
In this section, we address the issue of the level of aggregation of market destinations. In the 
previous section, results were obtained using the definition of geographical regions as they 
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have been set by the United Nations at the world level. According to this criterion, the location 
of subsidiaries has been assigned to 22 different geographical regions. In this section, we 
examine the robustness of results based on the use of countries as the effective location 
decision for subsidiaries instead of geographical regions. 
The use of geographical regions has two advantages. The first one is of practical order: limiting 
the number of destinations permits the estimation of elasticities, especially when using count 
models with dependent variables that are zero inflated. The second one is more theoretical in 
nature. Multinationals’ location choices are influenced by host market size considerations. 
Head and Mayer (2004) suggest that not only the size of the host country, i.e., subsidiaries’ 
locations, is important, but also the export potential offered by surrounding countries. From 
this perspective, using geographical regions, as we do in the previous section, is a good proxy 
for examining the location decision as it considers the market size of both the domestic and 
surrounding potential export markets.  In this section, we check for robustness using the 
country where the subsidiary is located instead of the geographical region as the choice 
variable for the firm. 
The specification is as follows: 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑔𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑔𝑔 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝑓𝑖𝑗              
(4) 
where all variables are the same as in equation (1) with the exception of  𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡, which is 
equal to one if parent firm f from country i has one or more subsidiaries in host country j at 
time period  t and 𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 is a set of host country dummies.   
Table 8 summarizes the scope elasticities estimated using destination countries as the choice 
variable by the MNCs for the whole sample of 36 countries of origin of the FDI. The coefficients 
for scope elasticities are smaller than those obtained with geographical regions. However, 
since the probability of investing abroad is lower when taking individual countries as targets 
than when taking geographical regions as targets, the estimated elasticity around the mean is 
very similar. Taking the elasticities of scope for the total economy as a reference, the 
estimated coefficient is 0.0038 (0.0066 for geographical regions) and the average probability of 
observing FDI in a given country is 3.2% (8.1% with geographical regions). The elasticity 
evaluated in the average indicates that a 10% increase in productivity increases the probability 
of operating a subsidiary by 1.2% (0.8% with geographical regions). Results are similar for 
manufacturing and services. The elasticity for manufacturing is 1.7% and 1.4%, using countries 
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and regions, respectively; for services it is 1.0% and 0.6%.  Given the values of average 
probabilities of investing abroad, the elasticities obtained with both definitions of destination 
markets are of the same order of magnitude.  
The ranking of countries for the value of their elasticities according to both market definitions 
is also very similar. Figure 4 reproduces the scatter for scope elasticities, taking estimates that 
use both countries and geographical regions as destinations as our reference. The figure draws 
a bisector of 45 degrees and takes into account only non-negative country elasticities. The 
countries are located around the bisector and shifted slightly to the right. This displacement 
reflects the lower elasticity values when they are estimated with country data. The calculation 
of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for the elasticity of scope gives a value of 0.945, and 
the null hypothesis that both rankings are statistically independent can be rejected at any 
significant level.   
The application of a second stage which is similar to the estimation of equation (3) and uses 
elasticities with country destinations gives a pattern of signs attached to the host country 
characteristics that are very similar to those shown in Tables 6. We do not reproduce this 
information.   
Overall, elasticities estimated with countries as destinations are slightly higher than those 
estimated using geographical regions. The ranking of elasticities across home countries is very 
similar for both geographical regions and countries. This makes the second stage, which 
examines the relationship between estimated elasticities and host country characteristics, 
produce results very similar to those which use geographical destinations, presented in section 
4. 
 
6. Conclusions  
This paper offers an empirical assessment of scope elasticities of MNCs at the world level. It 
explores this relationship for a sample of parent multinational firms that is representative of 
the world population of MNCs. The paper takes predictions of models of heterogeneous firms 
and FDI activity as a reference. The dataset used in the paper is based on the linking of 
information by ORBIS of parent firms that are ultimate owners of affiliate firms operating in 
foreign markets. The link requires both parent and affiliates to have the same main activity. 
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Our results confirm a positive relationship between parent firms’ productivity and the scope of 
MNCs. The average of scope elasticities indicates that an increase of 10% of parent firms’ 
productivity raises the probability of owning an affiliate in a given foreign market by 0.8%. 
Across countries, we confirm this positive relationship between productivity and scope of 
multinationals. Aggregate scope elasticities across countries are in the range of values from 
3.4% (Japan) to 0.3% (Austria and Canada). A large proportion of estimated elasticities are 
statistically significant positive, 52.8%. Negative elasticities, statistically significant different 
from zero, have not been estimated for the sample of countries with available information.      
The paper offers a complete set of results for an alternative measure of scope elasticities 
based on the number of subsidiaries that parent firms have in foreign markets. Count data 
models are used to estimate this set of elasticities. Although conceptually different, at the 
aggregate level they are relatively similar to the estimated elasticities that use a 0/1 variable. 
The alternative measure does not make a significant difference as it indicates that a 10% 
increase in the productivity of the parent firm raises the probability of controlling a subsidiary 
in a foreign market and/or of operating an additional subsidiary by 1.5%. Across countries, the 
ranking of scope elasticities is very similar for both approaches, those based on count models 
and the standard ones.  
An additional set of results refers to the comparison between manufacturing and services. 
Scope elasticities for manufacturing are larger than for the service sector. On average, scope 
elasticities for manufacturing MNCs more than double elasticities in the service sector. This 
difference between manufacturing and services also holds across countries. To our knowledge, 
this is one of the first attempts to systematically measure scope elasticities by distinguishing 
between manufacturing and services. We associate this result with the fact that the proximity-
concentration trade-off is relevant for many services. However, it is likely that the trade-off is 
stricter for manufacturing than for services and therefore this dissimilarity across both sectors 
translates into systematic differences in scope elasticities for both groups of activities. 
An entire section of the paper is devoted to the issue of heterogeneity of scope elasticities 
across countries and sectors. To perform this analysis, the paper follows the methodology 
known as Meta-Regression Analysis, which considers the distribution of estimated coefficients 
at the country and sector level, identifying those factors that drive heterogeneity in elasticities. 
The paper takes the literature of heterogeneous MNCs as a reference to identify the sign the 
relationship between elasticities and host country bilateral characteristics.  
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Two main results emerge from the MRA. First, once heterogeneity and publication biases are 
controlled, scope elasticities reduce somewhat. For the average elasticity that uses a 0/1 
variable, the estimated value reduces from 0.8 (without controls) to 0.6 (controlling for 
heterogeneity). Second, heterogeneity across elasticities from home countries is systematically 
related to differences across bilateral home-host characteristics. The list of variables includes 
the size of the potential host market, the bilateral distance, average tariffs of host countries, 
institutional quality of host countries and other factors. The signs attached to these factors are 
in general consistent with the predictions of models of multinational activity and 
heterogeneous firms.  
A final question refers to the sensitivity of estimated elasticities with respect to the level of 
aggregation used to define the geographical location of subsidiary firms. The results 
summarized so far refer to destinations defined for geographical regions as they have been set 
by the United Nations. The final section of the paper examines the sensitivity of results to the 
use of countries as final destinations instead of geographical regions. Elasticities estimated 
with countries are of the same order of magnitude. For the aggregate we obtain an elasticity of 
1.2 instead of 0.8, values which seem to be very close given the average probabilities of the 
phenomenon being examined. 
Our final comment is policy-oriented and derives from the relationship between host country 
characteristics and scope elasticities. Host country characteristics will affect not only the scope 
of MNCs but also the productivity distribution of parent firms that enter host countries 
(asymmetric effect hypothesis). From this perspective, host country characteristics have an 
impact on the productivity distribution of firms that enter foreign markets. This, in turn, affects 
host countries themselves, as productivity spillovers from MNCs to domestic firms are an 
important feature of FDI activity. Our results uncover this circularity in the relationship 
between host country characteristics and the productivity distribution of parent firms that 
invest abroad, which has some policy consequences from the perspective of MNCs.    
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Table 1 
Sample of firms 
 
Number of: (1) (2) (3) 
Parent firms 41,109 28,427 19,216 
Subsidiary firms 196,538 170,582 112,545 
Home countries (origin of FDI) 145 127 36 
Host countries 195 193 170 
 
Notes:  
(1) Initial sample 
(2) Requiring that the variable Sales of parent firm is available (unconsolidated data). 
(3) Requiring that the variable Sales of parent firm is available for the selected home countries. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Total Economy 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Services 
 mean sd  mean sd  mean sd 
Probability FDI 0.081 0.272  0.106 0.308  0.070 0.256 
Number of subsidiary firms in a given 
market (only if FDI=1) 
3.3 10.7  3.6 12.3  3.0 9.5 
Parent labor productivity (ln) 3.531 3.675  3.539 3.679  3.458 3.686 
GDP (host country, billion $) 1,166.2 1,523.5  1,427.0 1,710.4  990.6 1,340.7 
Distance (Km) 4,854 4,216  6,182 4,246  4,037 3,989 
Tariff rate (host country, %) 3.45 3.37  4.16 3.77  2.98 2.99 
Common language (proportion of countries) 0.166 0.249  0.166 0.257  0.163 0.243 
Colonial links (proportion of countries) 0.054 0.118  0.050 0.112  0.056 0.120 
Rule of law (host country, index 0-100) 71.7 21.4  68.1 21.5  74.3 20.8 
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Table 3 
The scope of multinational activity: propensity to invest in a foreign market (𝐷𝑁𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) as a 
function of parent firm’s labor productivity. 
 
 
Total 
economy 
Manufacturing Services 
Results at the aggregate level: 
Parent labor productivity 
(ln 𝐿𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑡−1) 
0.0066*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0149*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0044*** 
(0.0003) 
        
Average Probability 
Estimated elasticity (%)1 
0.081 
0.8 
0.106 
1.4 
0.070 
0.6 
    
R-Squared 0.143 0.167 0.159 
N. of observations  345,928 113,322 212,41 0 
Results at the country level: 
Number of countries  36 34 36 
    
Weighted average coefficient  0.0098 0.0232 0.0058 
Weighted average probability 0.083 0.108 0.072 
    
Estimated elasticities (%)1:    
     Weighted average 1.2 2.1 0.8 
     Maximum 3.4 5.1 3.6 
     Minimum -0.3 -50.8 -0.3 
    
% countries with elasticity positive 
and statistically significant   
52.8 55.2 
 
33.3 
 
 
Notes: 
- In parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity of OLS-estimated coefficients.  
- Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence levels, 
respectively. 
- 
1
 Elasticity estimated at the average probability; it indicates the increase in the probability of 
investing abroad in a given market when the parent’s productivity increases 10%.    
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Table 4 
Estimated scope elasticities across countries (Total economy)  
 
Country Coefficient Std. Error 
Average 
probability 
Estimated 
elasticity 
Austria 0.0018* 0.0010 6.6 0.3* 
Australia 0.0045* 0.0024 8.3 0.5* 
Belgium 0.0058*** 0.0017 6.9 0.9*** 
Canada  0.0017** 0.0008 6.4 0.3** 
Chile 0.0124* 0.0075 6.3 2.0* 
Cyprus 0.0020 0.0060 6.4 0.3 
Czechia 0.0032** 0.0014 4.8 0.7** 
Germany 0.0108*** 0.0015 9.3 1.2*** 
Denmark 0.0056* 0.0029 7.7 0.7* 
Estonia -0.0005 0.0035 4.8 -0.1 
Spain 0.0098*** 0.0012 6.6 1.5*** 
Finland  0.0112*** 0.0018 6.9 1.6*** 
France 0.0156*** 0.0017 9.9 1.6*** 
Greece 0.0020 0.0093 5.4 0.4 
Hong Kong -0.0018 0.0012 6.6 -0.3 
Croatia 0.0015 0.0021 4.9 0.3 
Hungary 0.0005 0.0015 5.0 0.1 
Ireland  0.0148*** 0.0050 12.5 1.2*** 
Iceland 0.0013 0.0053 5.3 0.2 
Italy 0.0011 0.0013 6.2 0.2 
Japan 0.0413*** 0.0021 12.0 3.4*** 
Republic of Korea 0.0156*** 0.0041 8.2 1.9*** 
Lithuania  0.0046 0.0032 5.0 0.9 
Luxembourg 0.0056*** 0.0021 7.0 0.8*** 
Latvia 0.0069 0.0054 4.9 1.4 
Malaysia 0.0008 0.0073 6.8 0.1 
Netherlands -0.0009 0.0027 7.0 -0.1 
Norway 0.0022 0.0021 6.0 0.4 
Poland -0.0013 0.0042 5.6 -0.2 
Portugal 0.0029* 0.0018 6.0 0.5* 
Romania  -0.0003 0.0078 4.6 -0.1 
Sweden 0.0059*** 0.0012 6.8 0.9*** 
Slovenia 0.0006 0.0025 5.0 0.1 
Slovakia 0.0017 0.0018 4.9 0.3 
Taiwan 0.0119*** 0.0024 7.6 1.6*** 
United States of 
America  0.0066*** 0.0005 10.9 0.6*** 
  
 
     
Total 0.0066*** 0.0003 8.1 0.8*** 
 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity of OLS-estimated coefficients. Average probability 
is expressed as a percentage. The elasticity is estimated at the average probability; it indicates the 
increase in the probability of investing abroad in a given market when the parent’s productivity increases 
10%. Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 5 
The scope of multinational activity: the number of subsidiary firms (𝑁𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) as a function of 
parent firms’ productivity. Count model estimators. 
 
 Total Manufacturing   Services 
 NBML ZINBML NBML ZINBML  NBML ZINBML 
Parent labor 
productivity  
(ln 𝐿𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑡−1) 
 
0.2016*** 
(0.0086) 
 
 
0.1540*** 
(0.0088) 
 
0.3249*** 
(0.0123) 
 
0.2317*** 
(0.0132) 
  
0.1524*** 
(0.0090) 
 
0.1230*** 
(0.0090) 
Constant -6.9989*** 
(0.3359) 
-5.3973*** 
(0.3604) 
-8.0933*** 
(0.6911) 
-6.2421*** 
(0.4199) 
 8.1864*** 
(0.1537) 
-6.4903*** 
(0.0125) 
Home country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Host country  FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
        
Model predicting zeros:  
Total number of 
subsidiaries 
 
 -0.3132*** 
(0.0084) 
 -0.3553*** 
(0.0124) 
 
  -0.2953*** 
(0.0125) 
 
Ln(GDP host 
country) 
 
 -0.1878*** 
(0.0204) 
 -0.3182*** 
(0.0197) 
  -0.1794*** 
(0.0450) 
Ln(Distance) 
 
 2.1781*** 
(0.0288) 
 1.4564*** 
0.0344 
  2.4226*** 
(0.0489) 
Home country FE  Yes  No   Yes 
Industry FE  Yes  No   Yes 
Overdispersion (α) 
 
6.9972*** 
(0.0993) 
2.2667*** 
(0.0395) 
4.9629*** 
(0.0905) 
1.6811*** 
(0.0397) 
 7.2360*** 
(0.1536) 
2.5225*** 
(0.0646) 
N. of observations 345,928 345,928 111,322 111,322  212,410 212,410 
Log-likelihood -125,431 -111,156 -49,744 -44,622  -66,720 -33,690 
 
Notes: in parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity of estimated coefficients. 
Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence levels, 
respectively. NBPML, negative binomial maximum likelihood; ZINBML, zero-inflated negative binomial 
maximum likelihood. 
 
  
34 
 
Table 6 
Meta-regression analysis of estimated coefficients (scope elasticities). 
Dependent variable: estimated coefficients in equation (1) by sectors and home countries. 
 
 OLS 
(Robust SE) 
WLS  
(Robust SE) 
WLS 
(Cluster home SE) 
Constant 0.0140*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0044*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0044** 
(0.0022) 
Standard error -1.4537*** 
(0.1347) 
0.8435** 
(0.4063) 
0.8435* 
(0.4660) 
Per capita GDP (home) 0.0003 
(0.0008) 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005 
(0.0005) 
GDP (home) -0.0000 
(0.0021) 
0.0015*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0015** 
(0.0006) 
Market size (host) -0.0045 
(0.0074) 
0.0037* 
(0.0022) 
0.0037 
(0.0027) 
Distance 0.0027 
(0.002) 
-0.0040** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0040* 
(0.0023) 
Common language -0.0027 
(0.0030) 
-0.0039*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0039** 
(0.0020) 
Cultural closeness 0.0032 
(0.0028) 
-0.0008 
(0.0008) 
-0.0008 
(0.0012) 
Institutional quality_WB (host)  -0.0047 
(0.0059) 
0.0039** 
(0.0018) 
0.0039* 
(0.0022) 
Institutional quality_WEF (host)  0.0068** 
(0.0028) 
0.0009 
(0.0009) 
0.0009 
(0.0013) 
Tariffs (host) -0.0016 
(0.0056) 
0.0068*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0068** 
(0.0031) 
Industry dummies yes 
 
yes yes 
N. of observations 106 106 106 
F-test 
(P-value) 
12.37 
(0.000) 
5.51 
(0.000) 
19.29 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R2 0.565 0.547 0.547 
 
Notes: Weighted least squares (WLS) using weights based on the inverse of the variance of the estimated 
coefficients with alternative standard error estimates: robust standard error or standard errors clustered at the 
home country level.  Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7 
Meta-regression analysis of estimated coefficients (scope elasticities, Count models). 
Dependent variable: estimated coefficients in equation (2) by sectors and home countries. 
 
 
 OLS 
(Robust SE) 
WLS  
(Robust SE) 
WLS 
(Cluster home SE) 
Constant 0.1403*** 
(0.0260) 
0.1296*** 
(0.0355) 
0.1296*** 
(0.0441) 
Standard error 0.0233 
(0.1420) 
0.3232 
(0.4488) 
0.3232 
(0.5096) 
Per capita GDP (home) -0.0252*** 
(0.0069) 
-0.0089 
(0.0053) 
-0.0089 
(0.0061) 
GDP (home) 0.0130 
(0.0189) 
0.0203 
(0.0138) 
0.0203 
(0.0172) 
Market size (host) 0.0572 
(0.0598) 
0.0317 
(0.0392) 
0.0317 
(0.0453) 
Distance -0.0537 
(0.0536) 
-0.0858* 
(0.0467) 
-0.0858 
(0.0568) 
Common language -0.0612** 
(0.0267) 
-0.0791*** 
(0.0188) 
-0.0791*** 
(0.0254) 
Cultural closeness -0.0099 
(0.0241) 
-0.0037 
(0.0229) 
-0.0037 
(0.0296) 
Institutional quality (host)  0.0950*** 
(0.0333) 
0.0851** 
(0.0356) 
0.0851* 
(0.0466) 
Tariffs (host) 0.1124*** 
(0.0327) 
0.1248*** 
(0.0303) 
0.1248*** 
(0.0353) 
Industry dummies yes 
 
Yes yes 
N. of observations 99 99 99 
F-test 
(P-value) 
3.86 
(0.000) 
14.90 
(0.000) 
10.29 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.593 0.593 
 
Notes: Weighted least squares (WLS) using weights based on the inverse of the variance of the estimated 
coefficients with alternative standard error estimates: robust standard error or standard errors clustered at the 
home country level.  Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8 
Sensitivity of results to different aggregation levels: estimated scope elasticities using 
countries as reference for destination markets.  
 
 Total economy Manufacturing Services 
Estimated coefficient 
(robust standard error) 
0.0038*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0074*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0028*** 
(0.0001) 
        
Average Probability 
Estimated elasticity (%)1 
0.032 
1.2 
0.042 
1.7 
0.029 
1.0 
    
R-Squared 0.053 0.092 0.040 
N. of observations  1,140,072 376,695 697,064 
 
Note: 1 Scope elasticity estimated at the average probability; it indicates the increase in the probability of investing 
abroad in a given market when the parent’s productivity increases 10%. 
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Figure 1 
Funnel plot of the distribution of estimated coefficients (scope elasticities) and its precision 
 
 
Note: The solid line shows the position of the precision weighted average of estimated coefficients (scope 
elasticities). The vertical axis measures the precision of coefficients calculated as the inverse of their standard 
errors.  We removed the coefficient for Greek manufacturing for visual purposes.  
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Figure 2 
Distribution of the number of subsidiary firms owned by a parent firm in a given market 
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Figure 3 
Average distance from parent firms of country i to host countries where they invest (in Km.) 
 
 
 
Note: This measure corresponds to weighted averages of host country variables.  This variable, Distance, weights, at 
the firm level, the existence of subsidiaries in the host country.   
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Figure 4 
Scope elasticities:  Sensitivity of results at different aggregation levels (Total Economy) 
 
Note: we only draw non-negative country coefficients. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1  
Estimated scope elasticities across countries (Manufacturing)  
 
Country       Coefficient  Std. Error 
Average 
probability 
Estimated 
elasticity 
Austria 0.0156*** 0.0047 9.2 1.7*** 
Australia 0.0147** 0.0074 11.5 1.3** 
Belgium 0.0157** 0.0074 11.2 1.4** 
Canada 0.0025** 0.0013 6.4 0.4** 
Chile 0.0206 0.0225 6.6 3.1 
Cyprus - - - - 
Czechia 0.0000 0.0033 4.5 0.0 
Germany 0.0574*** 0.0056 12.4 4.6*** 
Denmark 0.0220** 0.0091 12.9 1.7** 
Estonia 0.0000 0.0256 4.5 0.0 
Spain 0.0195*** 0.0055 7.2 2.7*** 
Findland 0.0506*** 0.0081 10.3 4.9*** 
France 0.0530*** 0.0062 17.7 3.0*** 
Greece -0.3337** 0.1629 6.6 -50.8 
Hong Kong -0.0032** 0.0014 6.0 -0.5 
Croatia 0.0000 0.0198 4.9 0.0 
Hungary 0.0001 0.0075 5.4 0.0 
Ireland 0.0189 0.0125 23.8 0.8 
Iceland - - - - 
Italy 0.0069** 0.0029 6.6 1.0** 
Japan 0.0479*** 0.0029 13.1 3.7*** 
Republic of Korea 0.0211*** 0.0051 7.9 2.7*** 
Lithuania -0.0000 0.1242 5.5 0.0 
Luxembourg -0.0000 0.0358 9.8 0.0 
Latvia -0.0000 0.0671 5.0 0.0 
Malaysia 0.0309 0.0237 6.1 5.1 
Netherlands 0.0198 0.0198 6.8 2.9 
Norway 0.0384** 0.0175 10.0 3.8** 
Poland 0.0006 0.0082 5.5 0.1 
Portugal -0.0033 0.0140 4.8 -0.7 
Romania 0.0000 0.0363 4.5 0.0 
Sweden 0.0186*** 0.0050 13.1 1.4*** 
Slovenia 0.0017 0.0120 4.9 0.3 
Slovakia 0.0029 0.0111 4.7 0.6 
Taiwan 0.0116*** 0.0024 7.5 1.5*** 
United States of America  0.0147*** 0.0013 13.7 1.1*** 
      
 
  
Total 0.0148*** 0.0007 10.6 1.4*** 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity of OLS estimated coefficients. Average probability is 
expressed as a percentage. The elasticity is estimated at the average probability: it indicates the increase in the 
probability of investing abroad in a given market when the parent’s productivity increases 10%. Superscripts ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table A2 
                               Estimated scope elasticities across countries (Services) 
 
Country      Coefficient  Std. Error 
Average 
probability 
Estimated 
elasticity 
Austria 0.0007 0.0010 6.0 0.1 
Australia 0.0030 0.0023 7.2 0.4 
Belgium 0.0050* 0.0017 6.1 0.8* 
Canada 0.0010 0.0012 6.6 0.2 
Chile 0.0117 0.0074 6.3 1.9 
Cyprus 0.0020 0.0060 6.4 0.3 
Czechia 0.0037** 0.0016 4.9 0.8** 
Germany 0.0038*** 0.0014 7.9 0.5*** 
Denmark 0.0019 0.0036 7.3 0.3 
Estonia -0.0005 0.0036 4.9 -0.1 
Spain 0.0085*** 0.0013 6.4 1.3*** 
Findland 0.0062*** 0.0018 5.9 1.1*** 
France 0.0108*** 0.0016 8.3 1.3*** 
Greece 0.0056 0.0107 5.2 1.1 
Hong Kong 0.0011 0.0023 6.9 0.2 
Croatia 0.0020 0.0028 4.9 0.4 
Hungary 0.0005 0.0016 5.0 0.1 
Ireland 0.0124** 0.0052 8.1 1.5** 
Iceland 0.0013 0.0053 5.1 0.2 
Italy -0.0008 0.0015 5.9 -0.1 
Japan 0.0362*** 0.0029 10.1 3.6*** 
Republic of Korea 0.0068 0.0067 9.0 0.8 
Lithuania 0.0046 0.0032 4.9 0.9 
Luxembourg 0.0056*** 0.0021 7.0 0.8*** 
Latvia 0.0073 0.0056 4.9 1.5 
Malaysia 0.0008 0.0077 7.4 0.1 
Netherlands -0.0009 0.0027 7.1 -0.1 
Norway 0.0007 0.0022 5.5 -0.1 
Poland -0.0019 0.0049 5.7 -0.3 
Portugal 0.0023 0.0019 6.1 0.4 
Romania -0.0003 0.0084 4.7 -0.1 
Sweden 0.0047*** 0.0012 6.0 0.8*** 
Slovenia 0.0009 0.0021 1.8 0.2 
Slovakia 0.0017 0.0019 4.9 0.3 
Taiwan 0.0158* 0.0100 8.4 1.9* 
United States of 
America  0.0044*** 0.0006 9.6 0.5*** 
      
 
  
Total 0.0044*** 0.0003 7.0 0.6*** 
 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity of OLS estimated coefficients. Average probability is 
expressed as a percentage. The elasticity is estimated at the average probability: it indicates the increase in the 
probability of investing abroad in a given market when the parent’s productivity increases 10%. Superscripts ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table A3 
The scope of multinational activity: the number of subsidiary firms (𝑁𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) as a function of 
parent firms’ productivity. Count model estimators (ZINBML).  
 Total Economy  Manufacturing  Services 
Country Coefficient  Std. Error   Coefficient  Std. Error   Coefficient  Std. Error 
Austria 0.1091**
 0.0429  0.2224*** 0.0673  0.1070** 0.0527 
Australia -0.0860* 0.0503  -0.0546 0.0773  0.0984** 0.0463 
Belgium 0.2103*** 0.0621  0.8578*** 0.1088  0.1076* 0.0573 
Canada  0.0977*** 0.0271  0.1651*** 0.0373  0.0082 0.0408 
Chile 0.2804*** 0.0924  -0.0283 0.4555  0.3577*** 0.0382 
Cyprus 0.0890* 0.0487  - -  0.0890* 0.4866 
Czechia - -  - -  0.1121** 0.0501 
Germany 0.2996*** 0.0348  0.5718*** 0.0503  0.1440*** 0.0387 
Denmark 0.0637 0.0634  0.2112*** 0.0760  0.0603* 0.0384 
Estonia 0.0298 0.0829  - -  0.0200 0.0783 
Spain 0.3942*** 0.0296  0.5996*** 0.0861  0.2624*** 0.0270 
Finland  0.2468*** 0.0651  0.4288*** 0.0720  0.1176*** 0.0728 
France 0.2153*** 0.0254  0.1809*** 0.0345  0.2036*** 0.0313 
Greece 0.0157 0.1480  -0.1289
 0.7451  0.0797 0.1540 
Hong Kong -0.1108***
 0.0248  -0.1900*** 0.7451  -0.0282 0.0459 
Croatia 0.0803* 0.0461  - -  0.1356* 0.0797 
Hungary - -  0.0906 0.0890  - - 
Ireland  0.0832** 0.0345  0.5959* 0.3466  0.1492 0.1252 
Iceland 0.0430 0.1625  - -  0.0586 0.0777 
Italy 0.0648* 0.0370  0.3233*** 0.0772  -0.0047 0.0312 
Japan 0.4403*** 0.0306  0.5176*** 0.0410  0.4565*** 0.0379 
Republic of Korea 0.2698*** 0.0546  0.6315*** 0.1112  0.0327 0.0887 
Lithuania  0.1624** 0.0695  - -  0.1730** 0.0734 
Luxembourg 0.1739*** 0.0563  0.8123
 1.0219  0.1722*** 0.0560 
Latvia 0.1551 0.1176  0.2322 0.2880  0.1338 0.1267 
Malaysia 0.0839 0.0654  0.0269 0.2246  0.0772 0.0649 
Netherlands -0.0187 0.0563  0.3017
 0.2321  -0.0147 0.0573 
Norway 0.1535*** 0.0556  0.3157* 0.1868  0.1836** 0.9072 
Poland 0.0168 0.0859  0.1951 0.1620  -0.0120 0.1005 
Portugal 0.3286*** 0.0459  0.0362 0.1673  0.1702*** 0.0501 
Romania -0.1143 0.1275  -1.1834 0.5062  -0.2285 0.2170 
Sweden 0.1735*** 0.0457  0.2201*** 0.0718  0.1638*** 0.0546 
Slovenia 0.0142 0.0614  0.2235 0.3656  0.0048 0.0737 
Slovakia 0.0299 0.0392  -0.0899 0.1373  0.0354 0.0489 
Taiwan 0.2354*** 0.0407  0.2359*** 0.4204  0.1245 0.1317 
United States of 
America  0.1013*** 0.0120  0.1552*** 0.0171  0.1024*** 0.0146 
          
Total 0.1540*** 0.0088  0.2548*** 0.0133  0.1230*** 0.0090 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.  Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table A4 
Average host country characteristics across countries (Total economy) 
 
Country 
Host country 
GDP 
(Thousands of 
millions of 
dollars) 
Distance 
(kms.) 
Trade 
tariffs 
(% duty) 
Common 
language 
(proportion) 
Colonial 
relationship  
(proportion) 
Rule of law 
(standarized 
values) 
Austria 1,672.4 1,358 1.837 0.293 0.232 0.422 
Australia 2,716.3 10,986 2.846 0.643 0.144 0.887 
Belgium 1,940.0 1,882 2.015 0.462 0.000 0.951 
Canada  9,054.0 5,094 2.731 0.700 0.091 0.680 
Chile 1,931.1 4,776 6.592 0.797 0.027 -2.763 
Cyprus 1,231.3 2,586 2.463 0.054 0.151 -0.814 
Czechia 572.7 569 1.464 0.000 0.023 -0.472 
Germany 2,027.9 2,833 2.662 0.143 0.062 0.468 
Denmark 1,894.1 2,265 2.168 0.000 0.002 1.067 
Estonia 477.0 710 1.641 0.000 0.103 0.326 
Spain 1,483.5 3,893 3.486 0.225 0.226 -0.298 
Finland  1,675.2 2,319 2.420 0.000 0.228 0.622 
France 1,837.1 3,275 3.030 0.176 0.116 0.231 
Greece 1,177.5 1,786 1.921 0.034 0.086 -0.397 
Hong Kong 5,889.1 6,848 5.244 0.829 0.069 -1.949 
Croatia 194.5 431 3.768 0.619 0.031 -1.634 
Hungary 547.7 588 1.016 0.548 0.000 -0.491 
Ireland  2,384.0 4,567 2.985 0.370 0.112 0.577 
Iceland 1,997.4 2,460 1.406 0.000 0.130 1.887 
Italy 1,903.3 2,593 2.677 0.052 0.000 0.039 
Japan 4,407.9 6,950 4.807 0.000 0.054 -0.436 
Republic of Korea 4,898.3 7,082 4.571 0.335 0.008 -0.636 
Lithuania  415.4 855 1.901 0.000 0.137 -0.359 
Luxembourg 2,176.3 1,310 1.574 0.000 0.091 1.211 
Latvia 698.4 831 1.711 0.000 0.096 0.438 
Malaysia 2,567.6 5,320 3.981 0.424 0.083 -0.656 
Netherlands 1,872.5 2,006 1.835 0.045 0.025 0.799 
Norway 1,369.0 1,987 1.799 0.000 0.000 1.439 
Poland 1,545.7 1,411 1.728 0.000 0.201 0.159 
Portugal 1,343.3 3,168 3.895 0.245 0.245 -0.420 
Romania  986.7 1,093 2.015 0.083 0.000 -0.333 
Sweden 1,542.9 2,006 2.246 0.000 0.119 1.270 
Slovenia 503.2 564 3.138 0.000 0.449 -1.384 
Slovakia 574.0 594 1.424 0.046 0.084 0.640 
Taiwan 7,696.5 6,394 5.542 0.396 0.010 -1.139 
United States of 
America  1,653.6 7,752 3.302 0.528 0.191 0.588 
        
Average 2,134.9 3,087 2.773 0.224 0.101 0.014 
Note: These measures correspond to weighted averages of host country variables.  
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Table A5 
Estimated scope elasticities across countries (Total economy)  
(Host countries: countries which have at least 50 affiliate firms) 
 
Country Coefficient Std. Error 
Average 
probability 
Estimated 
elasticity 
Austria 0.0016*** 0.0004 2.9 0.5*** 
Australia 0.0022*** 0.0008 3.3 0.7*** 
Belgium 0.0019** 0.0009 2.9 0.6** 
Canada  0.0008*** 0.0002 1.8 0.4*** 
Chile 0.0084** 0.0033 2.3 3.7** 
Cyprus 0.0013 0.0028 2.6 0.5 
Czechia 0.0013** 0.0006 1.7 0.8** 
Germany 0.0080*** 0.0007 4.3 1.8*** 
Denmark 0.0041*** 0.0014 3.7 1.1*** 
Estonia 0.0002 0.0013 1.7 0.1 
Spain 0.0065*** 0.0005 2.6 2.5*** 
Finland  0.0073*** 0.0009 3.0 2.4*** 
France 0.0119*** 0.0007 4.8 2.5*** 
Greece 0.0015 0.0035 2.0 0.7 
Hong Kong -0.0006 0.0003 1.9 -0.3 
Croatia 0.0014 0.0011 1.9 0.7 
Hungary 0.0000 0.0006 1.8 0.0 
Ireland  0.0142*** 0.0023 7.2 2.0*** 
Iceland 0.0023 0.0021 2.3 1.0 
Italy 0.0003 0.0006 2.3 0.1 
Japan 0.0257*** 0.0009 5.4 4.8*** 
Republic of Korea 0.0073*** 0.0015 3.1 2.4*** 
Lithuania  0.0048*** 0.0018 1.9 2.6*** 
Luxembourg 0.0031*** 0.0011 3.1 1.0*** 
Latvia 0.0039** 0.0022 1.9 2.1** 
Malasia -0.0011 0.0023 1.9 -0.6 
Netherlands -0.0015 0.0012 3.0 -0.5 
Norway 0.0030*** 0.0010 2.6 1.2*** 
Poland -0.0013 0.0016 2.2 -0.6 
Portugal 0.0017** 0.0007 1.9 0.9** 
Romania  0.0008 0.0029 1.5 0.5 
Sweden 0.0044*** 0.0006 3.1 1.4*** 
Slovenia 0.0007 0.0011 1.9 0.4 
Slovakia 0.0014* 0.0008 1.7 0.8* 
Taiwan 0.0047*** 0.0008 2.7 1.7*** 
United States of America  0.0030*** 0.0002 4.0 0.8*** 
  
 
      
Total 0.0038*** 0.0001 3.2 1.2*** 
 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity of OLS estimated coefficients. Average probability is 
expressed as a percentage. The elasticity is estimated at the average probability: it indicates the increase in the 
probability of investing abroad in a given market when the parent’s productivity increases 10%. Superscripts ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table A6 
Estimated scope elasticities across countries (Manufacturing)  
(Host countries: countries which have at least 50 affiliate firms) 
 
Country Coefficient Std. Error 
Average 
probability 
Estimated 
elasticity 
Austria 0.0088*** 0.0020 4.6 1.9*** 
Australia 0.0085*** 0.0027 5.1 1.7*** 
Belgium 0.0072** 0.0032 5.2 1.4** 
Canada  0.0009*** 0.0003 1.7 0.5*** 
Chile 0.0000 0.0090 1.9 0.0 
Cyprus  -  -  - -  
Czechia 0.0002 0.0017 1.6 0.1 
Germany 0.0378*** 0.0027 5.7 6.6*** 
Denmark 0.0192*** 0.0041 6.3 3.0*** 
Estonia 0.0000 0.0138 1.5 0.0 
Spain 0.0113*** 0.0022 2.7 4.3*** 
Finland  0.0317*** 0.0039 4.9 6.4*** 
France 0.0394*** 0.0037 9.5 4.1*** 
Greece -0.1945 0.0730 2.8 -69.0 
Hong Kong -0.0011 0.0004 1.7 -0.7 
Croatia 0.0132 0.0096 1.9 7.1 
Hungary 0.0017 0.0032 1.9 0.9 
Ireland  0.0114** 0.0051 14.0 0.8** 
Iceland  - -  -   - 
Italy 0.0051*** 0.0012 2.4 2.1*** 
Japan 0.0275*** 0.0013 5.9 4.7*** 
Republic of Korea 0.0094*** 0.0018 2.9 3.2*** 
Lithuania  0.0000 0.0456 1.8 0.0 
Luxembourg 0.0000 0.0116 4.2 0.0 
Latvia -0.0022 0.0213 1.9 -1.1 
Malaysia 0.0050 0.0101 1.7 3.0 
Netherlands 0.0065 0.0065 2.2 2.9 
Norway 0.0312*** 0.0087 4.4 7.1*** 
Poland -0.0002 0.0028 2.0 -0.1 
Portugal -0.0019 0.0045 1.5 -1.3 
Romania  0.0000 0.0125 1.5 0.0 
Sweden 0.0111*** 0.0022 6.6 1.7*** 
Slovenia 0.0003 0.0052 1.7 0.1 
Slovakia 0.0009 0.0058 1.7 0.6 
Taiwan 0.0039*** 0.0008 2.6 1.5*** 
United States of America  0.0061*** 0.0004 5.0 1.2*** 
  
 
    
 Total 0.0074*** 0.0002 4.2 1.7*** 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity of OLS estimated coefficients. Average probability is 
expressed as a percentage. The elasticity is estimated at the average probability: it indicates the increase in the 
probability of investing abroad in a given market when the parent’s productivity increases 10%. Superscripts ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table A7 
                               Estimated scope elasticities across countries (Services) 
(host countries: countries which have at least 50 affiliate firms) 
 
Country Coefficient Std. Error 
Average 
probability 
Estimated 
elasticity 
Austria 0.0010** 0.0004 2.6 0.4** 
Australia 0.0011 0.0008 2.6 0.4 
Belgium 0.0014 0.0009 2.5 0.5 
Canada  0.0007** 0.0003 2.0 0.3** 
Chile 0.0091*** 0.0034 2.5 3.6*** 
Cyprus 0.0013 0.0028 2.6 0.5 
Czechia 0.0015** 0.0007 1.7 0.9** 
Germany 0.0033*** 0.0006 3.7 0.9*** 
Denmark 0.0007 0.0017 3.5 0.2 
Estonia 0.0002 0.0013 1.8 0.1 
Spain 0.0054*** 0.0005 2.5 2.2*** 
Finland  0.0042*** 0.0008 2.4 1.7*** 
France 0.0086*** 0.0007 3.9 2.2*** 
Greece 0.0037 0.0039 1.8 2.0 
Hong Kong 0.0006 0.0006 1.9 0.3 
Croatia 0.0017 0.0014 1.9 0.9 
Hungary -0.0001 0.0007 1.8 0.0 
Ireland  0.0135*** 0.0026 4.7 2.9*** 
Iceland 0.0023 0.0021 2.1 1.1 
Italy -0.0011 0.0007 2.3 -0.5 
Japan 0.0245*** 0.0013 4.7 5.2*** 
Republic of Korea 0.0038 0.0026 3.4 1.1 
Lithuania  0.0048*** 0.0018 1.9 2.6*** 
Luxembourg 0.0031*** 0.0011 3.1 1.0*** 
Latvia 0.0038* 0.0022 1.8 2.1* 
Malaysia -0.0010 0.0012 2.1 -0.5 
Netherlands -0.0015 0.0012 3.1 -0.5 
Norway 0.0016 0.0010 2.3 0.7 
Poland -0.0015 0.0019 2.4 -0.6 
Portugal 0.0015** 0.0007 1.9 0.8** 
Romania  0.0008 0.0032 1.5 0.6 
Sweden 0.0037*** 0.0006 2.7 1.4*** 
Slovenia 0.0004 0.0013 1.9 0.2 
Slovakia 0.0014* 0.0008 1.7 0.8* 
Taiwan 0.0154*** 0.0037 3.5 4.4*** 
United States of America  0.0023*** 0.0002 3.6 0.6*** 
  
 
  
  Total 0.0028*** 0.0001 2.9 1.0*** 
 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity of OLS estimated coefficients. Average probability is 
expressed as a percentage. The elasticity is estimated at the average probability: it indicates the increase in the 
probability of investing abroad in a given market when the parent’s productivity increases 10%. Superscripts ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
 
